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THE INTERPRETATION OF MULTILINGUAL 
STATUTES BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
Lawrence M. Solan* 
U legislation is written in all of the EU’s official languages.1 Each 
version is authoritative, and no version is privileged as “the origi-
nal,” at least not as an official matter.2 The practice derives from the very 
first Regulation of the Council of the European Economic Community in 
1958, which declared Dutch, French, German, and Italian as the official 
languages.3 As countries have entered the EU, the Regulation has been 
amended to expand the number of official languages to match the official 
languages of the Member States.4 Moreover, the accession treaties them-
selves contain provisions that show respect for the linguistic diversity of 
the EU.5 For example, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam says: 
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 1. EEC Regulation 1, art. 4, 1958 (“Regulations and other documents of general 
application shall be drafted in the four official languages.”). 
 2. See Theodor Schilling, Language Rights in the European Union, 9 GERMAN L.J. 
1219, 1232–34 (2008). 
 3. EEC Regulation 1, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 4. In the earlier years, for example, the Regulation was amended to give official 
language status to Danish and English in 1973, Greek in 1981, Portuguese and Spanish in 
1986, and Finnish and Swedish in 1995. See LEIGH OAKES, LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL 
IDENTITY: COMPARING FRANCE AND SWEDEN 132 (2001). Most recently, the Regulation 
was amended in 2007 to give official language status (with certain unique derogations) to 
Irish. Council Regulation 920/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 156/3) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:156:0003:0003:EN:PDF. 
 5. Respect for linguistic diversity is EU policy. See Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
art. II-82, 2004 O.J. (C 310/41) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en00410054.pdf (“The Union shall respect cultur-
al, religious and linguistic diversity.”). 
E
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This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, Eng-
lish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish lan-
guages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, 
shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Re-
public, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments 
of the other signatory States. 
Pursuant to the Accession Treaty of 1994, the Finnish and Swedish ver-
sions of this Treaty shall also be authentic.6 
Since then, others have joined the EU, which now has twenty-seven 
members and twenty-three official languages.7 
The existence of a regime of multilingual legislation appears to create 
a daunting task for a court that must resolve disputes over a statute’s ap-
plicability in a particular situation. The opportunity for inconsistencies 
among the various language versions is so profound that it would not be 
surprising if the entire system collapsed under its own weight. 
But that has not happened. Whatever problems Europe and the EU 
face, statutory interpretation is not high on the list. On the contrary, the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) resolves disputes among Member 
States in what appears to be a routine manner.8 In this Article, I argue 
                                                                                                             
 6. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty of the European Union, art. 53, Oct. 
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 325/5). 
 7. Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment (EC), COM 
(2008) 566 final (Sep. 18, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/ 
pdf/com/2008_0566_en.pdf; European Commission, Member States of the EU, http://europa. 
eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2009). The entry in 2004 of 
Cyprus, Malta, and eight Eastern European countries nearly doubled the number of offi-
cial languages, jumping from eleven to twenty. Act of Accession, art. 58, 2003 O.J. (L 
236) 33, 48 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:236: 
SOM:en:HTML. In 2007, Bulgaria and Rumania joined the EU, and Irish was added as 
an official language. European Commission, Irish Becomes EU’s 23rd Official Language 
(Dec. 27, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/news/culture/061227_1_en.htm. 
 8. Part of the explanation for the ECJ’s success is that it seeks out Member States’ 
policy views and legal and judicial expertise. See Francis G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue 
and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 547, 549 (2003) (“[O]n every reference to the ECJ, both the parties to the na-
tional court proceedings and the governments of the Member States and the Union Insti-
tutions are entitled to present written observations and to take part in the hearing. Moreo-
ver, the [c]ourt itself is comprised of judges and advocates general from different Mem-
ber States and with experience of diverse legal systems. The [c]ourt also has a research 
department that can, for example, provide a survey on the national laws of the Member 
States.”). Nowadays, “[a]ll European judiciaries . . . accept [ECJ] decisions governing 
conflicts between Community law and Member State law.” Henry G. Schermers, Com-
ment on Weiler’s “The Transformation of Europe,” 100 YALE L.J. 2525, 2530 (1991), 
quoted in LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 12 (2001); Martin Shapiro, The European 
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that the proliferation of languages actually assists the ECJ in its interpre-
tation of statutes. To the extent that the goal of the court is to construe 
statutes to effectuate the intent of the legislature and to further the goals 
of the enacted directive or regulation, the existence of so many versions 
of the law makes this task easier. In other words, my argument is that the 
Babel of Europe facilitates communication. 
Ideally, the linguistic practices of a supranational legal regime should 
meet three goals. The first, the value promoted most aggressively by the 
EU, is respect for the equality and sovereignty of the individual Member 
States. By treating each version of an EU law as an authoritative original, 
EU members are treated equally. Although the EU has three working 
languages—English, French, and German—the final forms of all laws 
are not limited to these three.9 
The second goal concerning statutory interpretation in a supranational 
regime is that the laws should be construed in a manner that is faithful, in 
some meaningful way, to the intent of the drafters. Although fidelity to 
the legislative purpose is not the only goal of statutory interpretation,10 it 
is the principal goal in any legal regime. Yet it would appear to be more 
difficult to accomplish when laws are written in many languages, with 
each version, at least to some extent, reflecting the nuances of many legal 
cultures. If the laws mean very different things to the various members, 
whether because of legal, cultural, or linguistic differences among them, 
the project cannot succeed, since there will be no rule of law for the 
members to follow. 
The third goal is efficiency. If the burden of maintaining a suprana-
tional legal order exceeds its benefits, it will lose influence over time and 
devolve into an obscure, costly burden on its members. The brochure of 
the Directorate-General for Translation of the European Commission 
indicates that it employs some 2350 people (1750 of whom are full-time 
                                                                                                             
Court of Justice, in EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE “NEW” 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992) (discussing the ECJ’s role in 
shaping policy). 
 9. Europa, Languages—FAQ, http://europa.eu/languages/en/document/59 (last vi-
sited Feb. 28, 2009) (“The European Commission, for example, conducts its internal 
business in three languages, English, French and German, and goes fully multilingual 
only for public information and communication purposes.”). Note, however, that “[t]he 
European Parliament . . . has Members who need working documents in their own lan-
guages, so its document flow is fully multilingual from the outset.” Id. 
 10. See William Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1007, 1011 (1989). 
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translators),11 likely at a cost of hundreds of millions of euros a year. 
Each time a new member joins the EU, tens of thousands of pages of 
documents must be translated into the language of the new member. To 
take a recent example, prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
teams of sixteen Bulgarian and twenty Romanian translators arrived in 
Brussels to prepare for the addition of their languages to the group of 
official languages.12 
These three goals—equality, fidelity, and efficiency—are in tension 
with one another. It would surely be more efficient to legislate in a single 
language, or a small group of official languages, perhaps those that are 
now the working languages of the EU.13 Such a move, however, would 
reduce the degree to which the system respects the equality and sove-
reignty of the individual members, since those whose languages are not 
represented as official languages would play a somewhat diminished role 
in the legal process. 
The concern of this Article is with the second goal: fidelity. The ques-
tion explored is how faithful to the will of the legislative body can deci-
sion makers be in a system that produces legislation in many languages 
and gives equal status to each version. The question would seem difficult 
to answer in the abstract because there is no particular measure of fideli-
ty. However, it is certainly possible to investigate the extent to which the 
proliferation of languages affects the ability to render decisions faithful 
to the legislature in comparison to other regimes, such as those where 
decision makers operate in a monolingual legal order. It is also possible 
to hypothesize an intermediate legal order limited to a few languages and 
compare the work of the ECJ with what might happen in such a system. 
An “intermediate system” might contain, for example, three official lan-
guages in which legislation is written. Disputes could be resolved with 
reference to (a) the three official versions; and (b) the versions of the par-
ties to the dispute if they differ from the official versions. If, say, a dis-
                                                                                                             
 11. DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR TRANSLATION, EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRANSLATING FOR A 
MULTILINGUAL COMMUNITY 5 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/ 
bookshelf/brochure_en.pdf. 
 12. See Translation in the Commission: Where Do We Stand Two Years After En-
largement?, Commission Memo 06/173, Brussels (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/173&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 13. Some have argued that the passing of laws is delayed by the translation process 
and, accordingly, hinders other industries. See, e.g., Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy 
Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Bank 
Regulation?, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 423–24 (2006) (arguing that the 
“translation bottleneck” causes “serious delays” that hinder financial services law in the 
European Union). 
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pute arose between Finland and Sweden, the ECJ would look to the three 
official versions (likely, English, French, and German), plus the Swedish 
and Finnish versions, in rendering a decision. The three legal orders and 
their effects on the three goals discussed earlier are set out in Table 1: 
 
Table 1  
 
  Official    Official          All 
  Languages   Languages +          Languages 
 
Equality       -         +/-          + 
Fidelity       ?                     ?            ? 
Efficiency       +         +/-          - 
 
 
No doubt, the current legal order, reflected in the rightmost column, is 
both respectful of the sovereignty of the members, and quite costly, in 
terms of time and personnel. The open question is whether this multilin-
gual legal order makes it easier or harder for a judicial body to remain 
faithful to the will of the enacting legislative body. 
The rest of this Article explores this issue. Part I briefly develops the 
notion of fidelity more generally. Part II introduces the concept of Au-
gustinian interpretation: the use of multiple versions of the same law as 
an advantage in discovering its intended meaning. The term reflects the 
similarity between this approach to interpreting statutes and the same 
method, developed by St. Augustine in the fourth century, for interpret-
ing scripture. Part III explores the ECJ’s use of Augustinian interpreta-
tion, including some recurrent situations in which it falls short. 
I. FIDELITY TO LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE IN THE EU 
Almost as a mantra, the ECJ looks to the legislative purpose in inter-
preting statutes.14 Sometimes called the “teleological approach” or “pur-
posive approach” to statutory interpretation,15 the method is familiar to 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., Ian McLeod, Literal and Purposive Techniques of Legislative Interpre-
tation: Some European Community and English Common Law Perspectives, 29 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 1109, 1125 (2004). 
 15. See, e.g., Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 656, 656, 665 (1997) (observing the appropriateness of this kind of 
approach in a multilingual setting); Kenneth M. Lord, Note, Bootstrapping an Environ-
mental Policy from an Economic Covenant: The Teleological Approach of the European 
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those engaged in statutory interpretation in individual states. The court 
investigates the motivation for the legislation, including founding docu-
ments that set forth overarching legal goals, and resolves disputes in a 
manner that will further these goals.16 Thus, the court has said in a recent 
case, Schulte v. Deutsche Bausparkasse Bardenia AG, “Where it is diffi-
cult to interpret legislation from its wording alone, an interpretation 
based on purpose becomes fundamental. That is the case where the pro-
vision in dispute is ambiguous.”17 Such references to legislative purpose 
are easy to find.18 Barak has noted that purposive legislation typically 
“reflects, at various levels of abstraction, but particularly at the highest 
levels of abstraction, the intention of the text’s creator(s).”19 
Just as easy to find are references to legislative intent, which is similar 
to legislative purpose, but focuses on somewhat narrower goals.20 In fact, 
sometimes the ECJ uses both terms in the same case. For example, Sonia 
Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA21 dealt with whether the dis-
missal of an employee for reasons of illness violated the EC Framework 
Employment Directive 2000/78, which makes it illegal to dismiss an em-
ployee because of a disability. In holding that the Directive does not en-
compass ordinary illness, the court noted that in construing the Directive, 
account must be taken of “the context of the provision and the objective 
pursued by the legislation in question.”22 But it also gave credence to the 
argument that it is important to enforce the protection “intended by the 
                                                                                                             
Court of Justice, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 571, 597 (1996) (observing that the teleological 
method is used to harmonize local laws with EU directives). 
 16. JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 234, 250–51 (1993). 
 17. Case C-250/03, Schulte v. Deutsche Bausparkasse Bardenia AG, 2005 E.C.R. I-
09215, ¶ 87 (Opinion of the Advocate General), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/ 
content/juris/index.htm (follow “C-350/03” hyperlink; then follow “Opinion” hyperlink). 
 18. See, e.g., Case C-28/03, Epikouriko Kefalaio v. Ipourgos Anaptixis, 2004 E.C.R. 
I-08533, ¶ 26. 
 19. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 87 (2005). 
 20. See, e.g., Case C-54/07, Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racisme-
bestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, 2008 ECJ CELEX 607J0054, ¶ 12 (“Article 19 of that 
law is intended to transpose art[icle] 8 of Directive 2000/43 relating to the burden of 
proof.”); Case C-275/06, Productores de Musica de España (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de 
España SAU, 2008 ECJ CELEX 606J0275, ¶ 43 (“It should be observed to begin with 
that the intention of the provisions of Community law thus referred to in the question is 
that the Member States should ensure, especially in the information society, effective 
protection of industrial property, in particular copyright, which Promusicae claims in the 
main proceedings.”). 
 21. Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, 2006 E.C.R I-
06467. 
 22. Id. ¶ 40. 
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legislature,”23 by not giving employers carte blanche to ignore the disabl-
ing effects of certain illnesses. Thus, whether following a law’s lan-
guage, purpose, or intent, the court’s obligation is to be faithful, and to 
give primacy to the legislative body that enacted the law. 
Sometimes these approaches are contrasted with the goal of ascertain-
ing the intent of the legislature by reference to the language alone, as 
American textualists would prescribe.24 However, this distinction can be 
overstated. In its effort to be faithful to the will of the legislature, the ECJ 
is perfectly comfortable relying on language as an important clue. For 
example, in Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura,25 decided 
in 2005, the Advocate General noted, “The starting point for assessing 
[Article] 23 of the Agreement in isolation must be its wording.”26 
Because each EU directive is written in all twenty-three languages, this 
task is not a straightforward one, as the Advocate General observed: “[I]t 
must be borne in mind that Community legislation is drafted in various 
languages and that the different language versions are all equally authen-
tic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law thus involves a 
comparison of the different language versions.”27 Much of this Article 
argues that this additional step adds value to the linguistic analysis that 
takes place in the interpretation of monolingual legislation. Here, my 
point is that the ECJ does not ignore language in favor of ascertaining the 
legislative purpose. Rather, language provides a somewhat unique kind 
of evidence of purpose, and the court regards language differently for 
that reason. 
Articulating the goal of fidelity, however, is easier than determining 
exactly when a judicial body is faithful in any particular case. In mono-
lingual settings, the following questions recur: What does the statute say 
(generally, the best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in 
the law itself)? Does applying the plain meaning of the statute appear to 
undermine the intent of the legislature? If the statute is vague or ambi-
guous, are procedures available for resolving the ambiguity in order to 
reach a decision? If so, should courts risk compromising the rule of law 
as reflected in applying the statute as written in order to further the legis-
lative purpose? 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. ¶ 23. 
 24. See IAN MCLEOD, LEGAL METHOD 248–63 (2005). 
 25. Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 2005 E.C.R. I-
2579 (Opinion of the Advocate General), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/ 
juris/index.htm (follow “C-265/03” hyperlink; then follow “Opinion” hyperlink). 
 26. Id. ¶ 14. 
 27. Id. 
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These questions are not always easy to answer. To take an example 
from American law, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act permits the fed-
eral Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to regulate drugs and “de-
vices” used for the delivery of drugs. 28 At the time the law was enacted, 
it was clear that the legislature did not intend to permit the FDA to regu-
late tobacco or tobacco products.29 Since then, various efforts have been 
made to amend the statute to include tobacco, but these efforts have not 
succeeded.30 Nonetheless, during the Clinton administration, the FDA 
promulgated regulations that set limits on the distribution of tobacco 
products.31 One of the major tobacco companies, Brown & Williamson, 
sued, claiming that the federal agency had no right to do so.32 In re-
sponse, the agency argued that cigarettes can reasonably be seen as de-
vices for the delivery of nicotine, and therefore, come within the scope of 
the FDA’s regulatory authority.33 A principle of American law requires 
courts to defer to the interpretation of an agency to which regulatory au-
thority has been delegated if any reasonable understanding of the statute 
would support the agency’s interpretation.34 
In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the tobacco 
company and held the regulation to be invalid.35 At stake was whether 
the purpose of the statute should prevail over language—the word “de-
vice”—that seems to permit the agency to have taken the action it did.36 
In this case, the Court held that the independent contextual evidence that 
the legislature did not intend to permit the regulation of tobacco should 
trump both the language of the statute and the principle calling for defe-
rence to administrative agencies.37 
                                                                                                             
 28. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99a (1938). 
 29. See, e.g., S. 1468, 71st Cong. (1st Sess. 1929) (indicating that Congress consi-
dered and rejected a bill “[t]o amend the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, by extend-
ing its provisions to tobacco and tobacco products”). 
 30. See, e.g., S. 2298, 102d Cong. (2d Sess. 1992) (trying to amend the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act to grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products); S. 769, 101st 
Cong. (1st Sess. 1989) (trying to amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to grant the 
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products). 
 31. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
 32. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 33. Id. at 127. 
 34. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984). 
 35. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133. 
 36. Id. at 131–32. 
 37. Id. at 159–61. 
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On many other occasions, however, the Supreme Court has held that 
“the language of the statutes that Congress enacts provides ‘the most re-
liable evidence of its intent.’”38 This creates a dilemma for courts that 
wish to be loyal to the instructions of the legislature, but sensible in 
drawing inferences about what the enacting legislature intended. To 
make matters more difficult, in many cases the legislature had no dis-
cernable intent at all concerning situations that arise before courts. As 
Justice Scalia has put it, “[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of 
construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any 
clues provided by the legislative history are bound to be false.”39 Strange 
things happen in this world, and legislatures cannot possibly predict each 
one of them. Dan Simon has argued that when faced with this problem, 
courts typically speak of purpose and intent, but really use arguments 
based on coherence to reach a conclusion about how the enacting legisla-
ture would have wanted the law to handle a particular situation.40 
European courts have traditionally been more comfortable than Ameri-
can courts in placing the purpose of a statute ahead of the language in the 
service of effectuating the legislature’s will. Professors Summers and 
Taruffo have described this approach: 
The argument from ultimate purpose is today most often invoked in the 
USA when there is no credible argument from ordinary or technical 
meaning or when the argument from ultimate purpose merely rein-
forces the argument from ordinary or technical meaning; in other coun-
tries, such as Germany and Italy, the argument is invoked rather more 
widely. . . . The explanation for the declining repute of purposive ar-
gumentation in the USA, and for its relatively limited reception in the 
UK, is simply that it is often seen to conflict with arguments from ordi-
nary or technical meaning which are taken to be the best evidence of 
purpose anyway.41 
But evidence is evidence, whether it is put before an American court or a 
European court, and it is undeniable that the language of a statute pro-
vides privileged evidence of what the legislature intended. To take a 
classic example from the philosophical literature, when a law says “no 
                                                                                                             
 38. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6 (1999) (quoting United States v. Tur-
kette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981)). 
 39. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 32 (1997). 
 40. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 111 (1998). 
 41. Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, 
in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461, 472 (D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). 
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vehicles in the park,”42 one can argue about the law’s applicability to a 
child riding a tricycle, but no sane person would think that the law sets a 
minimum age for buying tobacco products or regulates the dumping of 
toxins in the sea. That is, language, while often not constraining the 
range of possible interpretations to one, surely is the principal vehicle 
through which legislative will is expressed, and this expression is largely 
successful. 
When it comes to the multilingual legislation of the EU, the options for 
achieving fidelity are both broader and narrower than they are for the 
monolingual legislation of most individual States. On the one hand, the 
introduction of additional language versions creates more data from 
which inferences of fidelity can be drawn. On the other hand, the prolife-
ration of authentic versions in different languages means that there will 
not be a coherent history leading from a statute’s purpose to its language, 
since a process of translation must intervene. Of course, individual States 
with legislation written in more than one language must make their own 
rules to deal with the status of the various legislative versions, as is the 
case in Belgium, Canada, and, to some extent, Spain.43 But in the typical 
situation in which a State’s laws are written in a single, authoritative ver-
sion, courts may use the statute’s language as a fulcrum, deciding how 
much weight to give it in a particular dispute. 
In contrast, when a dispute is over which of two fully authentic ver-
sions of a law should prevail, the status of the authoritative statutory lan-
guage is itself contested. Courts may still endeavor to find the purpose of 
a law, but they must do so without the luxury of resort to a single, au-
thoritative text.44 Thus, the option of being an American-style “textual-
ist”45 is simply not available to interpreters of EU law. Also politically 
unattractive, but potentially useful, is the translation history of a law. It 
would be perfectly sensible, for example, for a court to begin with the 
French version, if that was the one with which the European Commission 
began during the drafting process. Then, the court could determine 
whether other versions reflect an error in translation. The ECJ, however, 
                                                                                                             
 42. This example is widely discussed in the literature. For a discussion from a linguis-
tic perspective, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 
197–222 (2001). 
 43. For an excellent discussion of the bilingual and bijural regime in Canada, see 
Ruth Sullivan, The Challenges of Interpreting Multilingual, Multijural Legislation, 29 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 985 (2004). 
 44. For my views on some of the shortcomings of reliance on the literal meaning of 
the text in monolingual environments, see Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New 
Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027 (2005). 
 45. See id. at 2028. 
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typically does not engage in this method, although there are some early 
cases reflecting it, decided shortly after the Treaty of Rome, when there 
were six countries and four languages involved in EU legislation.46 
Stauder v. City of Ulm47 provides an important illustration of this early 
method. This case involved an EU regulation that empowered members 
to subsidize the sale of butter to certain consumer groups as a means of 
assisting the dairy industry.48 A consumer from the city of Ulm com-
plained when a retailer asked him to reveal his name in order to qualify 
for the benefit, asserting that it violated his constitutional right to digni-
ty.49 The German and Dutch versions authorized the butter benefit to be 
given to consumers who had a coupon issued in their name.50 The French 
and Italian versions required only that the consumer present an indivi-
dualized coupon.51 Who was right? The court noted that the European 
Commission, which had to approve the measure, had agreed to a draft 
written in French, wherein the buyer did not need to provide his or her 
identity.52 The court concluded that the divergences in the German and 
Dutch versions must have been translation errors that occurred when the 
text was prepared for adoption by the European Commission.53 
More recently, however, this method has been used less frequently, for 
the same reason that the EU has not established an official language or 
given additional status to the three working languages. Reference to the 
translation history is the functional equivalent of selecting an official 
language. Doing so offends basic notions of sovereignty and equality 
among the members. 
Yet, the ECJ does sometimes look at translation history as a last resort. 
Consider Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura,54 where the 
court construed an agreement made between the EU and Russia that re-
quired each Member State to “ensure” that Russian nationals would not 
be discriminated against when attempting to obtain employment.55 The 
complainant, a Russian national, was excluded from membership in a 
                                                                                                             
 46. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. 
 47. Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419. 
 48. Id. ¶ 1–2. 
 49. Id. ¶ 1. 
 50. Id. ¶ 2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶ 5. 
 53. Id. ¶ 3–7. 
 54. Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura, 2005 E.C.R. I-
2579 (Opinion of the Advocate General). 
 55. Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, EC-Russ. Fed’n, art. 23, June 24, 
1994, 1997 O.J. (L 327) 3. 
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certain football club, as required under Spanish law, which limited mem-
bership in this club to Spanish nationals. The court first looked at the 
various language versions of the EU-Russia agreement, but found that 
some versions, such as the English version, used the word “ensure,” 
while others, such as the Spanish, used words akin to “endeavor.”56 As 
there was no consensus, the court considered using the narrowest reading 
(“endeavor”), but found it to be unjustifiable under any legitimate theory 
of statutory interpretation.57 By the same token, the court was unable to 
eliminate either language type as an outlier.58 The court also rejected the 
idea of making a decision based on which interpretation was reflected in 
more languages than the other interpretation.59 After disposing of all of 
these other approaches, the court turned to the translation history in order 
“to consider the intention of the parties and the object of the provision to 
be interpreted.”60 The agreement was originally drafted in English, which 
uses the stronger word “ensured.” The court found this to be consistent 
with the broader purposes of the agreement in question. 
Whether used as a tool in statutory interpretation, or as a last resort, 
translation is surely relevant to the interpretation of EU law. The Ameri-
can legal scholar, Lawrence Lessig, proposed more generally that a use-
ful way of characterizing the quest for fidelity to legislative purpose is to 
liken the judicial role to that of a translator.61 As Lessig put it, “The 
translator’s task is always to determine how to change one text into 
another text, while preserving the original text’s meaning. And by think-
ing of the problem faced by the originalist as a problem of translation, 
translation may teach something about what a practice of interpretive 
fidelity might be.”62 Lessig, whose goal it was to explain statutory and 
especially constitutional analysis within the American legal system, 
spoke of translation as a way of expressing the thought that one can be 
faithful to a text without being entirely literal.63 Translators routinely 
must decide how to balance the target text’s choice of words against the 
likelihood that readers will understand the translation as conveying the 
                                                                                                             
 56. Simutenkov, 2005 E.C.R. I-2579 at ¶ 15. 
 57. Id. ¶ 16. 
 58. Id. ¶ 17 (noting that one “solution would be to determine the clearest text”). 
 59. Id. ¶ 18. 
 60. Id. ¶ 20. 
 61. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity as Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
 62. Id. at 1173. 
 63. Id. at 1189–94. 
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same information as the original, which may require straying from a lit-
eral translation.64 
Translation cannot paint a complete picture of statutory interpretation 
in the monolingual context, however. As Sanford Levinson has pointed 
out, the analogy between translation and monolingual legal interpretation 
is imperfect.65 Whereas translators bridge a knowledge gap between two 
groups of people separated by culture and language, the individual inter-
preting a monolingual statute is separated from the text only by time. 
How similar these gaps are is an empirical question. 
When it comes to multilingual legal regimes like the EU, translation is 
more than a metaphor—it is a basic fact about the entire structure of the 
law. While translation history may not be used as extrinsic evidence of a 
law’s meaning or purpose, a comparison of the various versions of the 
law provides an important tool for the ECJ.66 It is of crucial importance 
to determine how effective this tool is, since it must both replace analysis 
of the plain language of a single statute and do the work of the translation 
history to which statutory interpreters may not refer. To the extent that 
reference to different language versions provides useful evidence of sta-
tutory purpose, it leads to a remarkable inference: the proliferation of 
languages in EU legislation actually aids interpreters in their quest for 
fidelity. In other words, Babel is not punishment, it is a gift. 
II. AUGUSTINIAN INTERPRETATION IN THE EU 
Among the methods of statutory interpretation that the ECJ employs is 
a comparison of various versions of the statute in question in different 
languages.67 The court looks not only at the versions written in the lan-
guages of the parties to the particular dispute before the court, but also at 
other versions. For example, in Commission of the European Communi-
                                                                                                             
 64. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE NORD, TRANSLATING AS A PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY: 
FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES EXPLAINED (1997). 
 65. Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1457 
(1997). 
 66. See, e.g., Case 283/31, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of 
Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶18 (“To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Communi-
ty legislation is drafted in several languages and that the different language versions are 
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comparison of the different language versions.”). 
 67. For a description and examples of cases using some of these comparative me-
thods, see Geert Van Calster, The EU’s Tower of Babel—The Interpretation by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice of Equally Authentic Texts Drafted in More Than One Official 
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290 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
ties v. United Kingdom,68 the complainant challenged a domestic law 
written in English. Ultimately rejecting the English version, the ECJ 
compared the English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and 
Dutch versions of the relevant provision, which concerned workers’ en-
titlement to minimum daily and weekly rest periods.69 EU Directive 
93/104 required that workers be given eleven hours per day and a twen-
ty-four-hour period per week off from work.70 While the English version 
also mandated that workers receive time off,71 it measured work by per-
formance, rather than by time. Comparing the English version to those of 
other countries, the court determined that the British national legislation 
was too narrow to effectuate the objective of the relevant EU Directive.72 
The goals of this kind of multilingual inquiry are to determine consen-
sus among the members as to the intended scope of the statute, and to 
discover whether a particular interpretation allowed (or not allowed) in 
the language of one of the members is a matter of linguistic happenstance 
rather than legislative deliberation.73 I call this multilingual approach to 
statutory interpretation the “Augustinian approach.” 
In On Christian Doctrine, begun in the year 396, Augustine concerned 
himself with the question of how we can be sure that we understand, and 
therefore obey, the scriptures. He hypothesized, “Now there are two 
causes which prevent what is written from being understood: its being 
vailed either under unknown, or under ambiguous signs.”74 The solution, 
Augustine opined, was to look at the scriptures in both the original He-
brew and Greek, and in the various Latin translations: 
The great remedy for ignorance of proper signs is knowledge of lan-
guages. And men who speak the Latin tongue, of whom are those I 
have undertaken to instruct, need two other languages for the know-
ledge of Scripture, Hebrew and Greek, that they may have recourse to 
the original texts if the endless diversity of the Latin translators throw 
them into doubt.75 
                                                                                                             
 68. Case C-484/04, Comm’n of the Eur. Communities v. United Kingdom, 2006 
E.C.R. I-7471 (Opinion of the Advocate General), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/ 
content/juris/index.htm (follow “C-484/04” hyperlink; then follow “Opinion” hyperlink). 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. 
 70. Id. ¶ 5. 
 71. Id. ¶¶ 7–9. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 63–64. 
 73. See Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura, 2005 
E.C.R. I-2579 (Opinion of the Advocate General). 
 74. AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE bk. 2, ch. X, ¶ 15, available at http://ccat. 
sas.upenn.edu/jod/augustine/ddc2.html. 
 75. Id. ch. XI, ¶ 16. 
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Ambiguity in a text may remain unnoticed, especially if it results from 
bad translation. Even worse, an incorrect translation can lead to a mis-
take as to the actual content of the divine scripture, in turn causing even 
the faithful to err. The surest way to discover such problems is to place 
competing versions (both in Latin and in predecessor languages, Hebrew 
and Greek) side by side and look for differences. Examining the transla-
tion history can root out obvious errors in the Latin versions. Residual 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of promoting core religious val-
ues, such as charity.76 
What about those who do not know Hebrew or Greek? A comparison 
of Latin translations can also be helpful: 
For either [an unknown word or an unknown expression may impede 
the reader.] Now if these belong to foreign [languages], we must either 
make inquiry about them from men who speak those [languages], or if 
we have leisure we must learn the [languages] ourselves, or we must 
consult and compare several translators.77  
Again, comparing the Latin to the originals in Hebrew or Greek, whether 
directly or with the help of others learned in these languages, is Augus-
tine’s first solution.78 As for comparing various Latin translations with 
each other, while this at first appears to be a third-best method for those 
not able to consult the originals, it has its own advantages. Studying the 
various translations can be an improvement over relying upon a single 
translation. For even when translation is straightforward, some of the 
Latin vocabulary may be unfamiliar, making it necessary to infer mean-
ing from the surrounding linguistic context. Augustine noted, “In this 
matter too, the great number of the translators proves a very great assis-
tance, if they are examined and discussed with a careful comparison of 
their texts.”79 
Augustine’s reliance on a comparison of Latin translations was also a 
matter of necessity, as we now know. While he embraced whatever 
learning could be gleaned from studying the translation history of bibli-
cal text, he himself was not fluent in Greek and had even less control of 
Hebrew, at least early in his life. Frederick Van Fleteren notes, 
Unlike contemporary exegetes, Augustine exegizes the Latin text, not 
the original Greek or Hebrew text; perhaps Augustine was thinking of 
                                                                                                             
 76. I only touch on Augustine’s philosophy here. For a much fuller and richer discus-
sion, see JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE MYSTERY OF CONTINUITY: TIME AND HISTORY, 
MEMORY AND ETERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 123–39 (1986). 
 77. AUGUSTINE, supra note 74, ch. XIV, ¶ 21 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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priest-students in Carthage or Milan, or even his parishioners in Hippo. 
However, knowledge of foreign languages is necessary for the interpre-
tation of unknown or ambiguous signs—sadly Augustine was not an 
example of his own principles.80 
Others make similar observations.81 
Of Augustine’s two methods—comparing translations to the original 
and comparing translations to each other—only the latter is readily avail-
able to the ECJ. The former method, as mentioned above, is used less 
frequently since it is inconsistent with the principle of equality.82 Con-
ceptually, it is easy to see how resort to an original text can yield insight 
into the intent of the drafter of that document. In the absence of being 
able to draw such an inference, however, it is worth exploring just what 
makes the comparison of translations a valuable activity at all. Augustine 
provides some insight into this question as well. Not all translations are 
created equal. Again, in On Christian Doctrine, he complained: “[f]or in 
the early days of the faith every man who happened to get his hands upon 
a Greek manuscript, and who thought he had any knowledge, were it ev-
er so little, of the two languages, ventured upon the work of transla-
tion.”83 It is only by placing a bad translation next to a good one that, 
through a chain of inferences, the essence of the passage becomes clear. 
Sometimes a particular translation has captured it, but at other times, 
reading the various translations suggests a common theme, expressed in 
different words by each translator. 
Capturing this essence of a scriptural passage is the goal of the biblical 
scholar,84 and capturing the essence of EU legislation is the goal of the 
ECJ.85 Like Augustine, the ECJ may rely upon virtual consensus among 
                                                                                                             
 80. Frederick Van Fleteren, Principles of Augustine’s Hermeneutic: An Overview, in 
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 85. Article 220 of the consolidated version Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity provides that the ECJ is to “ensure that in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty the law is observed.” EC Treaty, art. 220, Dec. 24, 2002. Article 234 grants the 
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the different versions to uncover outliers that probably have simply got-
ten the point wrong, or it may attempt to find various threads running 
through the different versions which, taken together, suggest an underly-
ing purpose behind the legislation. 
Thus, Augustine and the ECJ are essentialists.86 Only if some deeper, 
underlying understanding exists in the first place can one justify an en-
terprise whose task is to uncover such an essence. For both Augustine 
and the ECJ, language provides strong evidence of this essence, but the 
essence cannot be reduced to any single version of the text. As discussed 
below, there is an imperfect relationship between thought (conceptualiza-
tion) and language (words). When evidence of thought becomes frozen 
in a single linguistic act, whatever imperfections exist become perma-
nent. The ability to compare different versions and then to triangulate, 
however, brings out nuances that can help the investigator gain addition-
al insight into the thoughts of the original drafter. For this reason, one 
would predict that the proliferation of languages in the EU actually aids 
the task of statutory interpretation, making it more likely that the court 
will come upon the intended goals of the legislation before issuing a rul-
ing. 
But biblical studies have one big advantage over the project of disco-
vering the purpose behind EU law. There really is an original. For our 
purposes, statutory interpretation in the EU is statutory interpretation 
without a single, authoritative text.87 Moreover, biblical translation, at 
least in the time of Augustine, involved only one target language—
Latin.88 Whether the European endeavor will succeed, in contrast, must 
depend upon a variable not relevant to Augustine: how well Augustinian 
interpretation will succeed in the multilingual statutory context is a func-
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tion of what makes languages similar to each other and what makes lan-
guages different from each other. 
In some respects, it seems likely that the proliferation of languages will 
help the statutory interpreter. To the extent that one language contains a 
syntactic ambiguity that allows multiple interpretations of a law, whereas 
other languages do not, the Augustinian approach will quickly unmask 
the outlier and make clear that the legislative body intended the meaning 
common to the other language versions. Far more difficult are the prob-
lems that arise from subtle differences in the meanings of words from 
language to language. The more people are designed to form similar con-
cepts given similar experiences, the less it should matter which language 
they speak and the better a multilingual legal order should work. Diver-
gence from one language version to another might be analyzed according 
to the following considerations: (a) people in different cultures speaking 
different languages have different experiences, reflected in words that 
appear to be translations of each other but really are not (e.g., considera-
tion/consideración, cause/causa);89 (b) languages express concepts diffe-
rently from each other in small ways, suggesting that there is some truth 
to the Whorfian hypothesis that the concepts a language makes available 
influence thought;90 and (c) people conceptualize idiosyncratically even 
when they share both experiences and cultural norms (for example, 
people vary as to whether they would say that a person who has deceived 
another person into believing something false has lied if the deception 
does not literally involve a false statement).91 If these sorts of conceptual 
issues did not arise, there would be no particular reason to engage in the 
Augustinian project because there would be no difference between one 
language and another. This is not to say that languages are internally 
crisp. But it does mean that looking at different languages to ascertain 
the purpose behind a law will only work if the different language ver-
sions are not exactly the same as one another, in both the intentional and 
extensional senses. Yet the languages must be close enough to each other 
to permit only a small set of possible interpretations. Otherwise, the 
amount of discretion available to a court would be so broad as to chal-
lenge the very notion of a supranational order governed by the rule of 
law. 
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The solution to this problem lies in the nature of conceptualization. 
The concepts of people who speak different languages and live in differ-
ent cultures will be most alike if people are designed to form the same or 
similar concepts from the same or similar experiences; and the expe-
riences of people from the various Member States of the EU are similar 
enough. Using somewhat different vocabulary, Engberg nicely lays out 
this problem.92 Thus, the likelihood of identical concepts has both an in-
nate component (our cognitive design) and a cultural one (how culture 
structures experience and represents it in that culture’s language). 
As for the innate component, during the past three decades, considera-
ble progress has been made in the study of how people form concepts 
and categories. Many now believe that our concepts are complex entities 
consisting in part of prototypes based on experience, and in part of defi-
nitional conditions, whether necessary or sufficient.93 Peter Tiersma and I 
have used the dictionary definition of the word “chair” to illustrate this 
point.94 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, one of the lead-
ing dictionaries of American English, defines the word as follows: “[a] 
usu[ally] movable seat that is designed to accommodate one person and 
typically has four legs and a back and often has arms.”95 The only neces-
sary (i.e., definitional) component is that the thing must be a seat de-
signed for one person. All of the other features are prototypical in nature, 
expressed in the definition with the words “usually,” “typically,” and 
“often.” 
Psychologists now believe that we conceptualize by forming mental 
models that contain both kinds of information, and perhaps even more 
complex elements, such as how a concept interacts causally with the 
world.96 No doubt people who speak different languages do not have 
precisely the same concepts. The fact that our concepts are in part com-
prised of experientially-based mental models would make such uniformi-
ty impossible. Moreover, work by the linguist Anna Wierzbicka shows 
that very few concepts are universally expressed in the languages of the 
world.97 
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What is necessary for the success of the Augustinian method, then, is 
not the universality of concepts, but rather the universality of how our 
minds are designed. Similar experiences cause us to produce more or less 
the same concepts, whether considered individually or culturally. As the 
philosopher Jerry Fodor puts it, we conceptualize a “doorknob” as “the 
property that our kinds of minds lock to from experience with good ex-
amples of . . . doorknob[s] . . . [by] virtue of the properties that they have 
[as] typical doorknobs.”98 If German and French doorknobs differ from 
each other, then we may find some differences in the mental models of 
doorknobs that French and German people form in their minds. But giv-
en exposure to the same types of doorknobs, including a sense of what a 
prototypical doorknob looks like, people of all cultures will make more 
or less the same thing of their experience. This suggests that to explain 
the success of Augustinian interpretation, not only must we be Whor-
fians,99 but we must also be Chomskyans,100 in the sense that an explana-
tion of our innate endowment is a prerequisite to justifying the approach. 
III. MULTILINGUAL INTERPRETATION IN PRACTICE 
Augustinian interpretation does not always succeed—but it often does. 
Before we get to what can go wrong, let us look at a few examples of 
what may go right. Much of the time, consensus among the various lan-
guage versions is used as a means to confirm the ECJ’s sense of the 
law’s purpose, which had already been determined on other grounds. For 
example, Pretura unificata di Torino v. X involved a regulation permit-
ting local authorities to exceed concentrations of foreign particles in the 
water supply under certain emergency circumstances.101 Criminal pro-
ceedings had been brought against an official of Torino for violating Ital-
ian law by permitting excessive amounts of a contaminant to enter the 
water supply.102 He defended by relying upon the EU regulation.103 
Looking at various versions of the regulation, the court concluded that “it 
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appears from the different language versions of Article 10(1) that the 
term ‘emergencies’ must be construed as meaning urgent situations in 
which the competent authorities are required to cope suddenly with diffi-
culties in the supply of water indented for human consumption.”104 Since 
this was not the case, the EU regulation would not provide a defense to 
domestic environmental crime prosecution.105 
At other times, as Augustine noted, various language versions can be 
used to find and discard outliers. Sometimes, the issue concerns simple 
errors in translation. Recall that the court typically avoids referring to 
any particular translation history because of the principle of equality. A 
broad comparison among language versions, however, makes a historical 
account unnecessary, as long as there is relative consensus. Many of 
these cases involve word choice. Consider Lubella v. Hauptzollamt Cott-
bus.106 A regulation adopted protective measures with respect to the im-
port of certain cherries into the EU.107 Just about all of the versions of the 
regulation used the word for “sour cherries.”108 But the German version, 
for some reason, had used the word for sweet cherries (Suesskirschen).109 
This fact made the scope of the challenged regulation entirely beyond 
controversy.110 
Lubella provides an excellent vehicle for comparing the Augustinian 
approach to discovering a statute’s purpose with a textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation. The latter approach risks ossifying drafting er-
rors that result from legislation written in clear, but erroneous, language. 
The study and comparison of various versions, in contrast, permit infe-
rences to be drawn based upon consensus and outlying language. Most 
interestingly, this Augustinian approach does not require courts to stray 
from official textual material to extrinsic evidence subject to manipula-
tion. To the contrary, the absence of a single text and the presence of 
many official, authoritative documents together provide a great deal of 
information that monolingual legislation does not. Thus, Augustinian 
interpretation gives maximum evidentiary weight to documents that ac-
tually have official status, reducing the likelihood that judges will substi-
tute their values for those of the legislative body by straying too far from 
the legislative process in their analyses. 
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Other cases involve grammatical nuances. For example, in Paterson v. 
W. Weddel & Co., the issue before the court was a criminal prosecution 
within the United Kingdom for violation of a regulation setting certain 
limitations on the operations of trucks.111 An EU regulation, however, 
allows members to exempt from this regulation “transport of animal car-
casses or waste not intended for human consumption.”112 The United 
Kingdom had availed itself of this exemption, so if the shipper’s conduct 
was covered by the exemption, then no crime was committed.113 While it 
is clear that the exemption applies to waste not intended for human con-
sumption, the question was whether it applies to all carcasses or only to 
those carcasses not intended for human consumption.114 The shipper be-
ing prosecuted was shipping, among other things, sides of beef intended 
for human consumption.115 The court looked at a number of versions of 
the regulation, finding most of them ambiguous.116 In the Dutch version, 
however, “the qualifying words ‘not intended for human consumption’ 
precede the term ‘carcasses’ and consequently can apply only to both 
waste and carcasses.”117 The unequivocal version was given a privileged 
status in this context and was used to reinforce arguments based upon the 
purpose of the regulation.118 
To those versed in American law, the problem resembles cases that 
consider the proper application of the last antecedent rule, which says 
that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modify-
ing only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”119 The problem 
with this rule, however, is that in situations like the one before the ECJ, it 
is not possible to determine in advance whether the last antecedent is the 
entire disjoined phrase or the last of the disjuncts. Augustinian metho-
dology provides evidence that may help in resolving this question in par-
ticular cases. 
In contrast, the Augustinian method does not always bear fruit. Jan 
Engberg120 writes about Commission of the EU v. United Kingdom,121 a 
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case involving how we conceptualize fishing. British trawlers were en-
gaged in joint fishing expeditions in the Baltic Sea with Polish traw-
lers.122 The British vessels would cast the nets; the Polish vessels would 
then trawl for fish; and the Polish vessels would then turn the nets over to 
British vessels, which would bring the fish on board.123 If these fish were 
deemed to have been caught by the Poles, then a tariff would be due.124 If 
caught by the British, there would be no tax.125 
The English version of the regulation in question says first that “goods 
wholly obtained or produced in one country shall be considered as origi-
nating in that country”;126 and second that “the expression ‘goods wholly 
obtained or produced in one country’ means . . . products of sea-fishing 
and other products taken from the sea by vessels registered or recorded in 
that country and flying its flag.”127 The Commission claimed that the 
Poles had “obtained” the fish since they were the ones who separated the 
fish from their natural habitat.128 The British claimed that “taken from the 
sea” should be construed literally, and that the fish did not leave the sea 
until the British trawler lifted the nets containing the fish that were 
caught by the Poles.129 
To resolve the dispute, the court looked at a number of different lan-
guage versions, but learned nothing from them.130 The French extraits de 
la mer was subject to both interpretations: taken out of the sea and sepa-
rated from the sea.131 Other versions, including the Greek, Italian, and 
Dutch, were just as ambiguous.132 The German word, gefangen, meaning 
caught, was more helpful to the Commission’s position.133 The court 
conceded that “a comparative examination of the various language ver-
sions of the Regulation does not enable a conclusion to be reached in 
favour of any of the arguments put forward and so no legal consequences 
can be based on the terminology used.”134 Anthony Arnull observed that 
this is the typical approach of the court in such situations.135 In this case, 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. ¶ 2. 
 123. Id. ¶ 3. 
 124. Id. ¶ 4. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. ¶ 7. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. ¶ 11. 
 129. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
 131. Id. ¶ 15. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. ¶ 16. 
 135. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE (1999). 
300 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
the court determined, without the assistance of a comparative analysis of 
the various language versions, that holding the British vessel liable for 
the tariff was more consistent with the purpose of the regulation.136 The 
opposite result would have permitted members to “game” the regulation 
by doing with impunity just what the regulation sought to prohibit: im-
porting fish caught by nonmembers into the EU without the imposition 
of a market penalty.137 Thus, the court relied on arguments based on co-
herence as a surrogate for legislative purpose.138 
What went wrong? Recall that multilingual statutory interpretation is 
essentialist in nature. Since there is no single text, there must be some 
message that the array of texts, taken as a body, has attempted to convey. 
The significant overlap in meaning implies that to a large extent, the 
communication is likely to have been successful. When I, as a native 
speaker of English, refer to fishing, however, I really do not know 
whether the essential element is pulling the fish out of the water or catch-
ing the fish on the line. It has never really mattered much to me. Perhaps 
they are both part of the essence, or perhaps they are alternatively part of 
the essence. If what is true for me is true for many people in my culture 
and for many people in very similar cultures where Germanic and Rom-
ance languages are spoken, then it should not be surprising to find confu-
sion across the board, with only a few languages taking a position on the 
matter—perhaps as a matter of happenstance, perhaps for more interest-
ing cultural and historical reasons. 
What we can conclude from this case is that Augustinian reasoning 
does not work to clarify a concept when the dispute requires us to take a 
position on a subtle aspect of the concept that has been neither culturally 
nor individually resolved. If the essence of fishing is not a universal, and 
if our common experience permits us to focus on both aspects of the ac-
tivity with more or less equal attention, then the comparison of different 
language versions will have taught us only that a particular version’s 
clear statement in one direction or the other is likely to be accidental and 
should be ignored. Thus, Augustinian methodology, even when it does 
not give us a single answer, may caution against drawing strong conclu-
sions from the clarity of any particular version. 
CONCLUSION  
Let us return to the three values discussed at the beginning of this Ar-
ticle: equality, fidelity, and efficiency. In Table 1, the question of fidelity 
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was an open issue. At this point, we can fill in some of the question 
marks as follows in Table 2: 
 
Table 2  
 
  Official    Official          All 
  Languages   Languages +          Languages 
 
Equality       -         +/-          + 
Fidelity       -                     ?            + 
Efficiency       +         +/-          - 
 
 
That is, the proliferation of language versions appears to add to the like-
lihood that the court will get a case right, where getting it right means 
issuing a judgment that is more likely to further the purpose behind the 
law, and that is consistent with the intent of the enacting legislature. This 
is true when the method appears to succeed, and it is even true when the 
method appears to fail, in that the knowledge that the members’ versions 
lack consensus gives the court due warning that it should not pay too 
much attention to any particular version that appears clear on its face. 
The conclusion that Babel actually serves to clarify communication is a 
surprising one, especially for an American academic who is accustomed 
to an environment in which at most two languages are spoken, and who 
comes from a culture in which textual analysis reigns, both in statutory 
interpretation and the law of contracts. Nonetheless, my happy conclu-
sion is precisely this: Augustine had it right when he observed that the 
careful study of different translations of the same text is likely to lead to 
a deeper understanding of the text’s essential meaning. 
